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A TWILIGHT ZONE NO MORE: THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
PROVIDES TORT REFORM DRAFTING TIPS WHILE DISTANCING
ITSELF FROM DEFERENCE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN
JOHNSON v. ROCKWELL AUTOMATION, INC.
Jodie L. Hill*
I. INTRODUCTION
Tort reform has generated national controversy since its inception in
the late 1960s.' The tort reform movement did not begin in Arkansas, how-
ever, until 1979 with the passage of the Medical Malpractice Act.2 The topic
of tort reform continues to inspire heated debate, both nationally and local-
ly, which has recently included discussion of federally mandated tort reform
to combat the rising cost of health care.3 The Arkansas General Assembly's
latest foray into tort reform, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003 (CJRA),
4
has encountered its fair share of scorn with its constitutionality being conti-
nuously tested in state and federal trial courts and a spate of articles criticiz-
ing it for a multitude of reasons.5
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1. Courtney A. Nelson, Note, To Truly Reform We Must Be Informed: Davis v. Par-
ham, the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the Constitutionality of Tort Reform in Arkan-
sas, 59 ARK. L. REv. 781, 787-90 (2006). See generally Kimberly J. Frazier, Note, Arkan-
sas's Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003: Who's Cheating Who?, 57 ARK. L. REv. 651, 653-58
(2004) (discussing factors that contributed to a national movement towards tort reform).
2. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 790-91.
3. Ceci Connolly, Obama to Speed Up Tort Reform Tests, but Doctors Want More,
WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2009/09/17/AR2009091704676.html?hpid=topnews.
4. 2003 Ark. Acts 649 (codified as amended in ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-201 to
-220).
5. Brian G. Brooks, Phantoms, Empty Chairs, and Diminished Recoveries: Why the
"Empty-Chair" Provision of Act 649 Violates the Arkansas Constitution, ARKANSAS
LAWYER, Winter 2009, at 14. See Joseph R. Falasco, Sizing up a Multi-Party Tortfeasor Suit
in Arkansas: A Tale of Two Laws-How Fault Is, and Should Be, Distributed, 26 U. ARK.
LITrLE ROCK L. REv. 251 (2004); Frazier, supra note 1; Nancy C. Marcus, Phantom Parties
and Other Practical Problems with the Attempted Abolition of Joint and Several Liability, 60
ARK. L. REv. 437 (2007); Nelson, supra note 1. Contra Jason W. Earley, I Ain't Afraid of No
Ghost: Why the Arkansas Supreme Court of Arkansas Should Uphold Fair Share Liability
and Non-Party Apportionment, ARKANSAS LAWYER, Winter 2009, at 18. See also Hamilton
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The Arkansas Supreme Court recently issued a decision striking down
two of the CJRA's provisions as unconstitutional. In that case, Johnson v.
Rockwell Automation, Inc., 6 the court held that the two statutes at issue,
Arkansas Code sections 16-55-202 and 16-55-212(b), violated separation of
powers.7 This article will focus solely on the separation of powers as it was
the argument relied upon by the court in Johnson. This article will begin
with a review of the court's movement from deference to nondeference to
the General Assembly in regard to rule-making related to public policy,
8
followed by a summary of the facts of Johnson and the court's holdings.9
The article will next outline the problems with the substantive-procedural
distinction relied upon by the court in Johnson10 and provide an analysis of
Arkansas Code sections 16-55-202 and -212(b) under prior separation of
powers precedent for rule-making related to public policy.l The article will
then include proposed revisions of Arkansas Code sections 16-55-202 and
-212(b) to comply with the directives of Johnson.12 The article will con-
clude with a call for the Arkansas Supreme Court to return to an attitude of
cooperation with the General Assembly to "allow a healthy and orderly de-
velopment of procedural reform" for rule-making regarding public policy.13
II. THE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT'S JOURNEY FROM DEFERENCE TO
NONDEFERENCE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN RULE-MAKING RELATED
TO PUBLIC POLICY
Prior to the adoption of amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution by
general election in November 2000,' 4 the Arkansas Supreme Court had in-
herent authority over rules of practice and procedure, including rules of
v. Allen, 100 Ark. App. 240, 253-56, 267 S.W.3d 627, 637-39 (2007) (Baker, J. dissenting)
(arguing that the CJRA should have no impact on standard of review for orders granting
motions for summary judgment in medical malpractice cases).
6. 2009 Ark. 241,__ S.W.3d .
7. Id. at 8, S.W.3d at _
8. See discussion infra Part II.
9. See discussion infra Part III.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
12. See discussion infra Part V.
13. Curtis v. State, 301 Ark. 208, 210, 783 S.W.2d 47, 48 (1990); see discussion infra
Part V.
14. http://www.sos.arkansas.gov/ar-constitution/arcamend80/arcamend80.htm. Some
have suggested that Amendment 80 eliminated any ambiguity over the court's supreme au-
thority over rule-making. Brooks, supra note 5, at 42. However, the Arkansas Supreme Court
continued to show deference to the General Assembly in rule-making related to public policy
even after the enactment of Amendment 80. See infra notes 30, 31, and 37. See also Cato v.
Craighead County Cir. Ct., 2009 Ark. 334, - S.W.3d .
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evidence, under article 7, section 4 of the Constitution of 1874.15 Rules of
court had existed from as far back as 1457,16 and authority for such rule
-making existed because of (1) inherent power under separation of powers,
(2) express constitutional grant, or (3) enabling legislation. 17 From the early
1940s, the trend throughout courts in the United States favored court regula-
tion of its practice and procedure as part and parcel of separation of pow-
ers. 18 The Arkansas Supreme Court shared this viewpoint.' 9 In the 1970s,
the court adopted several sets of procedural rules including the Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Supersession Rule, which provides as fol-
lows: "All laws in conflict with the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rules for Inferior Courts shall be deemed
superseded as of the effective dates of these rules."2 ° Each of these rules
became effective on July 1, 1979.2
The Arkansas Supreme Court also understood, however, that complete
delineation of rule-making authority to the judiciary was impracticable and
impossible because of the overlap between the everyday governmental func-
tions of the General Assembly and the courts. 22 The court noted that a twi-
15. Ricarte v. State, 290 Ark. 100, 104-05, 717 S.W.2d 488, 489-90 (1986) (citing John
H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL.
L. REv. 276 (1928)). See also Thomas F. Green, Jr., To What Extent May Courts Under the
Rule-Making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A. J. 482 (1940); Edmund J.
Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REv. 467 (1957);
Charles W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, Rules of Practice & Procedure: A Study of Judicial
Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REv. 623 (1957). In Ricarte, the Arkansas Supreme Court formal-
ly adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence under its inherent rule-making authority. Ricarte,
290 at 104, 717 S.W.2d at 489. Interestingly, all of article 7 was repealed by amendment 80,
which became effective July 1, 2001. http://www.sos.arkansas.gov/ar-constitution/arcart7/
arcart7-1 .htm.
16. Curtis, 301 Ark. at 210, 783 S.W.2d at 48 (citing Joiner & Miller, supra note 15).
17. Id. at210,783 S.W.2d at 48.
18. See Ricarte, 290 Ark. at 104-05, 717 S.W.2d at 489-90 (citing Wigmore, supra
note 15; Green, supra note 15; Morgan, supra note 15). See also Curtis, 301 Ark. at 210, 783
S.W.2d at 48 (citing Joiner & Miller, supra note 15).
19. Ricarte, 290 Ark. at 104, 717 S.W.2d at 490. Arkansas's separation of powers doc-
trine is contained in its Constitution:
The powers of the government of the State of Arkansas shall be divided into
three distinct departments, each of them to be confided to a separate body of
magistracy, to-wit: Those which are legislative, to one, those which are execu-
tive, to another, and those which are judicial, to another.
No person or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, shall ex-
ercise any power belonging to either of the others, except in the instances herei-
nafter expressly directed or permitted.
ARK. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1-2.
20. 2 ARKANSAS RULES ANNOTATED 12.3 (2009).
21. Weidrick v. Arnold, 310 Ark. 138, 141, 835 S.W.2d 843, 845 (1992).
22. Curtis, 301 Ark. at 210, 783 S.W.2d at 48.
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light zone existed between the powers of the court and the powers of the
General Assembly in determining which entity should establish some pro-
cedures: "[T]here is a crepuscular, or twilight, zone which makes it difficult
to determine whether the legislature or the judiciary should establish some
procedures." 
23
Of course, the court agreed that-theoretically-all rules of practice
and procedure were governed by the court:
[I]f every power exercisable in government must go exclusively and as a
whole into one of the three categories, [executive, legislative, or judi-
cial,] the power of making detailed rules of legal procedure is analytical-
ly judicial-it is inherent in the exercise of the power committed to the
judiciary of determining controversies and applying laws.
24
Nevertheless, such rigorous delineation was unrealistic in the day-to-day
operation of government and the courts. 25 Because this area of indefinition
26
exists between the functions and activities of the judiciary and the General
Assembly, conflicts between the rule-making functions of these bodies nec-
essarily occur and can be resolved only through cooperation between
them.27
One such conflict occurred in Curtis v. State,28 in which the defendant
challenged his rape conviction of his girlfriend's seven-year-old daughter
because the conviction had been based on the child's videotaped testimo-
ny.29 The General Assembly had enacted Arkansas Code section 16-44-203,
a statute that authorized the prosecution to videotape a young victim's tes-
timony outside of the jury's presence and then show the videotaped testi-
mony to the jury.30 This process was followed in Curtis.3t With this back-
23. Id. at 210, 783 S.W.2d at 48.
24. 1d. at 211, 783 S.W.2d at 48 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Procedure Under Rules of
Court in New Jersey, 66 HARv. L. REV. 28, 37 (1952)),
25. Id. at 211-12, 783 S.W.2d at 49 (quoting Joiner & Miller, supra note 15). Even
political scientists have discarded "the theory of complete and exclusive authority over pre-
cisely delineated spheres of activity." Id. at 211, 783 S.W.2d at 49 (quoting Joiner & Miller,
supra note 15).
26. Joiner and Miller described this overlap as "a twilight zone of indefinition:"
It is well established that the operational areas of everyday governmental func-
tions are not defined with precision and are not capable of assignment to distinc-
tive categories; instead there is and always has been a twilight zone of indefini-
tion, wherein the functions and activities of the three branches overlap and con-
flict, and wherein cooperation among the three branches has been key to the res-
olution of the conceptual puzzle.
Joiner & Miller, supra note 15, at 629.
27. Curtis, 301 Ark. at 211, 783 S.W.2d at 49 (quoting Joiner & Miller, supra note 15).
28. 301 Ark. 208, 783 S.W.2d 47 (1990).
29. Id. at 209-10, 783 S.W.2d at 48.
30. Id.
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drop-and in order to allow for development of procedural reform between
the judiciary and the General Assembly in this twilight zone-the Arkansas
Supreme Court established the following purpose-focused framework to
facilitate cooperation with the General Assembly:
If the purpose of the rule is to permit a court to function efficiently, the
[court's] rule-making power is supreme unless its impact conflicts with a
fixed public policy which has been legislatively or constitutionally
adopted and has at its basis something other than court administration.
When the purpose of the rule is to provide for the establishment or main-
tenance of the efficient administration of judicial business, and it does
only that, the scope of the power vested in the courts is complete and
supreme. However, until an area of practice or procedure is preempted
by rules of court, we will give full effect to legislation. This will allow a
healthy and orderly development of procedural reform.
32
From this pronouncement, two bright-line rules regarding legislatively
enacted rules of practice and procedure can be derived: (1) any rule related
solely to court functionality or administration-and not public policy-is
unconstitutional as a violation of separation of powers;33 and (2) any rule
related to an area of practice or procedure 34 for which the Arkansas Su-
preme Court has not previously adopted a rule is constitutional because the
court has not yet asserted its power in that area.35 Relying on the second
rule, the Curtis court held that, because the Arkansas Supreme Court had
yet to deal with videotaping a young victim's testimony outside of the jury's
presence, the statute was not unconstitutional even though it dealt with pro-
cedure and evidence.36 Because the statute dealt with an area of practice and
procedure for which the court had not asserted its rule-making authority, the
court found no need to clarify the third, less clear rule regarding
31. Id.
32. Id. at212,783 S.W.2d at 49.
33. Id. The court relied upon this rule in Price v. Price, in which it held Arkansas Code
section 16-65-121 unconstitutional because the statute dealt with when a court's decision
became effective. 341 Ark. 311, 315-16, 16 S.W.3d 248, 251 (2000). Likewise, the court
held unconstitutional Arkansas Code section 16-67-201, which provided a six-month dead-
line to appeal a county court order. Pike Ave. Dev. Co. v. Pulaski County, 343 Ark. 338, 341,
37 S.W.3d 177, 178 (2001).
34. While not necessarily synonymous, the phrases "court functionality or administra-
tion" and "practice and procedure" are used interchangeably in this article. Any distinction
between the two phrases has not been relied upon by the Arkansas Supreme Court in its
decisions related to separation of powers.
35. Curtis, 301 Ark. at 212, 783 S.W.2d at 49. The Arkansas Supreme Court later relied
upon this rule in Sera v. State to uphold the rape-shield statute, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-
101(b), as constitutional. 341 Ark. 415, 443, 17 S.W.3d 61, 78 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
998 (2000).
36. Curtis, 301 Ark. at 212, 783 S.W.2d at 49.
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rule-making that touched upon functionality or administration of courts, but
also related to "a fixed public policy which has been legislatively or consti-
tutionally adopted"--or the twilight zone between the judiciary and the
General Assembly.
37
The Arkansas Supreme Court provided a clearer formulation of the
third rule in State v. Sypult.38 In that case, the statute at issue, Arkansas
Code section 12-12-511(a), provided that confidential statements by a pa-
tient to a physician or psychotherapist were admissible as evidence in "any
proceeding regarding child abuse, sexual abuse, or neglect of a child or the
cause thereof., 39 The court noted that the General Assembly's exception
contradicted the court's previously established rule of evidence, the physi-
cian- and psychotherapist-patient privilege. 40 The court then explained that,
if the General Assembly enacted a rule that conflicts with a court rule, then
the court would defer to the General Assembly only if the court rule's "pri-
mary purpose and effectiveness is not compromised."41 The court noted that
the privilege at issue existed to encourage patients to communicate openly
with these medical care providers without fear of disclosure, and the Gener-
al Assembly's rule completely defeated this purpose in certain instances.42
The court thus held the statute unconstitutional.43
After Sypult, Arkansas courts and the General Assembly had a clear
framework to follow in determining whether the General Assembly's rule-
making violated separation of powers:
(1) A General Assembly rule dealing only with court functionality or
administration-and not public policy-is unconstitutional.
44
(2) A General Assembly rule for an area of practice or procedure for




38. 304 Ark. 5, 800 S.W.2d 402 (1990).
39. Id. at 6, 800 S.W.2d at 403-04 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-51 1(a)).
40. Id at 6-7, 800 S.W.2d at 404.
41. Id. at 7, 800 S.W.2d at 404. The court followed the same rule in Casement v. State,
in which it held unconstitutional a statute regulating bond procedures for post-conviction
appeals. 318 Ark. 225, 230, 884 S.W.2d 593, 595-96 (1994). The court followed a similar
framework in White v. Newport, in which it upheld the municipal tort immunity statute,
Arkansas Code section 21-9-301. 326 Ark. 667, 672, 933 S.W.2d 800, 803 (1996). Likewise,
the court upheld the timeline for adjudication hearings set forth in the juvenile code, even
though the statute conflicted with Rule 40(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.
Hathcock v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 347 Ark. 819, 824, 69 S.W.3d 6, 9 (2002).
42. Sypult, 304 Ark. at 8, 800 S.W.2d at 404.
43. Id.
44. Curtis, 301 Ark. at 212, 783 S.W.2d at 49.
45. Id.
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(3) A General Assembly rule dealing with either court administration
or practice and procedure that implements a legislative public policy and
conflicts with a court rule is constitutional only if it does not compro-
mise the primary purpose and effectiveness of the conflicting court
rule.
4 6
The Arkansas Supreme Court has consistently followed these rules with two
notable exceptions, Weidrick v. Arnold and Summerville v. Thrower.4 8
Weidrick concerned the constitutionality of the sixty-day notice re-
quirement prior to filing a medical malpractice complaint contained in Ar-
kansas Code section 16-114-204(a). 49 The court had previously held that the
statute did not conflict with Rule 3 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Proce-
dure5" despite adding an additional step for a plaintiff wishing to file a med-
ical malpractice complaint.51 In Weidrick, however, the court reversed
course and concluded that such a conflict did exist, overruling its previous
holdings.52 Based on this conflict, the court held the statute unconstitution-
al.53 Similarly, the Summerville case dealt with the constitutionality of Ar-
kansas Code section 16-114-209(b), which required a medical malpractice
plaintiff to file an affidavit of reasonable cause by an expert within thirty
days of filing suit.5 4 Relying on Weidrick, the court struck down the statute
as conflicting with Rule 3.55
After determining a conflict existed, neither the Weidrick nor Summer-
ville courts attempted to determine whether the General Assembly's rule-
making compromised Rule 3's primary purpose and effectiveness as re-
quired by the third Sypult rule. Additionally, neither court considered the
public policy behind the General Assembly's rule-making. 56 Instead,
46. Sypult, 304 Ark. at 7, 800 S.W.2d at 404.
47. 310 Ark. 138, 835 S.W.2d 843 (1992).
48. 369 Ark. 231, 253 S.W.3d 415 (2007).
49. Weidrick, 310 Ark. at 140-41, 835 S.W.2d at 844.
50. Rule 3 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure deals with commencement of a
lawsuit. In addition to filing a complaint with the clerk of court, Arkansas Code section
16-114-204(a) also required a potential medical malpractice plaintiff to provide a medical
provider with sixty days' notice prior to filing suit.
51. Jackson v. Ozment, 283 Ark. 100, 101-02,671 S.W.2d 736, 738 (1984).
52. Weidrickat 141-42, 835 S.W.2d at 845 (citing Simpson v. Fuller, 281 Ark. 471, 665
S.W.2d 269 (1984); Jackson v. Ozment, 283 Ark. 100, 671 S.W.2d 736 (1984)).
53. Id. at 146-47, 835 S.W.2d at 848.
54. Summerville, 369 Ark. at 232,253 S.W.3d at 416.
55. Id. at 239, 253 S.W.3d at 420.
56. The Weidrick court merely noted that the sixty-day notice statute had been enacted
as part of a statutory scheme "to help control the spiraling cost of health care." 310 Ark. at
140-41, 835 S.W.2d at 844 (quoting 1979 Ark. Acts 709, § 11). Similarly, the Summerville
court observed that the affidavit requirement was enacted to lower medical-malpractice in-
surance costs. 369 Ark. at 238, 253 S.W.3d at 420. In 1996, approximately eighty insurance
companies provided medical malpractice insurance coverage for Arkansas doctors. Frazier,
2010]
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through these cases, the Arkansas Supreme Court focused solely on whether
the General Assembly's rule was substantive or procedural in nature. In
Weidrick, the court noted the distinction in relation to the Supersession
Rule,57 but provided little discussion about the distinction. 8 In Summerville,
however, the court finally provided some detail for the substantive-
procedural division.5 9 Quoting from Black's Law Dictionary, the court out-
lined the differences between substantive and procedural law:
The boilerplate definition of substantive law is "the part of the law that
creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties,"
while procedural law is defined as "[t]he rules that prescribe the steps
for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that
defines the specific rights or duties themselves."
60
In his dissent in Weidrick, Justice Steele Hayes foresaw problems with
61making such a stark distinction. When determining whether a provision is
substantive or procedural, the court looked only at the specific provision at
issue instead of the whole statutory scheme. 62 As Justice Hayes noted, Ar-
kansas Code section 16-114-204(a) was part "of a series of substantive laws
[intended to] completely supplant the common-law medical malpractice
action., 63 He believed that by striking down one provision, the court placed
the whole statutory scheme in danger.64 Further, some procedural issues,
such as statutes of limitations, are outside of the court's rule-making pow-
ers, making the distinction meaningless.65
supra note 1, at 660-61. By 2004, that number had dropped to eleven. Id.
57. See supra Part II for additional discussion regarding the Supersession Rule. None of
the cases following Weidrick contained any discussion of the Supersession Rule.
58. Weidrick, 310 Ark. at 144, 835 S.W.2d at 846.
59. Summerville, 369 Ark. at 237, 253 S.W.3d at 419-20.
60. Id. at 327, 253 S.W.3d at 419-20 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1443, 121
(7th ed. 1999)).
61. Weidrick, 310 Ark. at 147-53, 835 S.W.2d at 848-51.
62. Id. at 149, 835 S.W.2d at 849.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 151, 835 S.W.2d at 850. Specifically, Justice Hayes noted that the sixty-day
notice requirement should have been read in conjunction with Arkansas Code section 16-
114-204, the statute of limitations clause, and Arkansas Code section 16-114-205, which
eliminated the requirement for any allegation of damages in the complaint. Weidrick, 310
Ark. at 149, 835 S.W.2d at 849. Without the sixty-day notice, a defendant would have no
information regarding a plaintiff's damages until discovery was completed. Id. at 151, 835
S.W.2d at 850. In addition, the sixty-day notice prolonged the statute of limitations for medi-
cal malpractice actions until as much as two years and five months. Id.
65. Weidrick, 310 Ark. at 152, 835 S.W.2d at 850-51. The Summerville court, however,
attempted to explain away this conundrum:
"[A] true statute of limitations, one that will be considered procedural in nature,
extinguishes only the right to enforce the remedy and not the substantive right it-
[Vol. 32
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Before and between the 1992 Weidrick decision and 2007 Summerville
decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court applied the separation of powers
analysis it had set forth in Curtis and its progeny.66 With its decision in
Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.,67 however, the court signaled its in-
tent to forgo any of the Curtis rules and apply only the procedural-
substantive distinction from Weidrick and Summerville.68
III. JOHNSON V. ROCKWELL A UTOMA TION, INC.
69
Following the enactment of the CJRA in 2003, its constitutionality was
challenged frequently in state and federal trial courts. In 2007, the Arkansas
Supreme Court refused to address the constitutionality of the CRJA because
those issues were moot on appeal.70 The next opportunity the court had to
consider those arguments was Johnson.
A. Facts and Procedural History
According to the complaint filed in federal court, Darrell Johnson was
injured on February 24, 2004, while he was working as a control systems
mechanic for Eastman Chemical Company ("Eastman"). 71 At the time of the
accident, Johnson was working in an Allen-Bradley "starter bucket," which
self." . . . [I]f the statute extinguished the right to bring the lawsuit itself, rather
than the right to enforce the remedy, then it would be substantive.
Summerville, 369 Ark. at 238, 253 S.W.3d at 420 (quoting Middleton v. Lockhart, 355 Ark.
434, 438, 139 S.W.3d 500, 502-03 (2003)). Unfortunately, the difference between substan-
tive and procedural law is easily stated, but difficult to fully explain. How could a plaintiff
ever enforce a remedy without bringing a lawsuit?
66. See supra notes 35, 37, and 40-45 and accompanying text.
67. 2009 Ark. 241, __ S.W.3d__
68. Since Johnson, the Arkansas Supreme Court followed the new rule in Cato v.
Craighead County Circuit Court upholding Arkansas Code section 12-62-403, which re-
stricts service upon military personnel during service. 2009 Ark. 234, at 1, _ S.W.3d _,
• The court stated the following in Cato: "Under our holding in Johnson, the only ques-
tion that need be asked is whether the challenged legislation dictates procedure. If the legisla-
ture bypasses our rules of pleading, practice, and procedure by setting up a procedure of its
own, then it violates the separation-of-powers doctrine." Id. at 8, _ S.W.3d at _. The
court found the provision to be substantive law because it created a special right for military
personnel. Id. at 8-9, _ S.W.3d at _
69. 2009 Ark. 241, S.W.3d __ (Johnson II).
70. Shipp v. Franklin, 370 Ark. 262, 267, 258 S.W.3d 744, 748-49 (2007). In Shipp, the
defendant filed a third-party complaint against Sarah Sanders. Id. at 263, 258 S.W.3d at 746.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Sanders 100 percent responsible. Id., 258 S.W.3d at
748-49. Sanders subsequently settled with Shipp. Id. at 267, 258 S.W.3d at 749. According-
ly, the court refused to rule on the constitutional challenges to the CJRA as its decision
would have no practical effect upon the case. Id. at 267, 258 S.W.3d at 748-49.
71. Johnson II, 2009 Ark. 241, at 2, __ S.W.3d at
20101
UALR LAW REVIEW
was designed, manufactured, and supplied to Eastman by Rockwell Auto-
mation, Inc. ("Rockwell").72 Ordinarily, the starter bucket's safety interlock
would prevent the starter bucket from becoming electrically powered.73 On
this instance, however, the safety interlock failed, the starter bucket became
electrically powered, and Johnson was injured. 74 Johnson's complaint al-
leged that the starter bucket's safety interlock was designed, manufactured,
and supplied in a defective condition.75 In its answer, Rockwell claimed that
after it had supplied Eastman with the starter bucket, Eastman had modified
it without Rockwell's knowledge.76 Rockwell also reserved all defenses
available to it under the CJRA and specifically asserted its rights thereunder
to (1) restrict its liability to its percentage share of actual liability and (2)
name nonparties at fault.77 Rockwell later filed a "Notice of Nonparty Fault"
in accordance with Arkansas Code section 16-55-202, naming Eastman as a
nonparty at fault.78
After the accident, Johnson's employee medical plan paid for his med-
ical care and treatment, but the amounts paid by the plan were less than the
total balance due for his medical care and treatment.79 Johnson sought to
introduce evidence of the full amount, while Rockwell sought to limit such
evidence to those amounts (1) paid by Johnson, (2) paid'on behalf of John-
son, (3) which remained unpaid and for which Johnson was responsible, or
(4) which remained unpaid and for which another third party was legally
responsible pursuant to Arkansas Code section 16-55-212(b). 80 Johnson and
Rockwell filed a joint motion for certification of the following questions to
the Arkansas Supreme Court:
8'
(1) Under the facts of this case, whether the provisions of Act 649 of
2003, including, but not limited to those codified at Ark. Code Ann. §
16-55-202, that require a fact finder to consider or access the negligence
or fault of nonparties, violates the Arkansas Constitution, when consi-
dered along with modifications of "joint and several" liability in the





76. Id. at 3, S.W.3d at
77. Johnson 11, 2009 Ark. 241, at 3, __ S.W.3d at .
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 3-4, _ S.W.3d at.
81. Id. at 1, S.W.3d at _
82. Id. at 1-2, S.W.3d at _; Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 374 Ark. 217,
218, 286 S.W.3d 726, 726 (2008) (Johnson 1).
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(2) Under the facts of this case, whether provisions of Act 649 of 2003,
including, but not limited to those codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-
212(b), that addresses evidence of damages for the costs of necessary
medical care, treatment, or services, violate the Arkansas Constitution.
83
The district court granted the motion,84 and the Arkansas Supreme Court
accepted certification to address the constitutionality of those provisions of
the CJRA.
8 5
B. The Court's Holdings
The Arkansas Supreme Court determined that both statutes were un-
constitutional, 86 and its decision includes a similar analysis for both provi-
sions. The nonparty fault provision at issue provides the following:
(a) In assessing percentages of fault, the fact finder shall consider the
fault of all persons or entities who contributed to the alleged injury or
death or damage to property, tangible or intangible, regardless of wheth-
er the person or entity was or could have been named as a party to the
suit.
(b)(1) Negligence or fault of a nonparty shall be considered if the plain-
tiff entered into a settlement agreement with the nonparty or if the de-
fending party gives notice that a nonparty was wholly or partially at fault
not later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the date of trial.
(2) The notice shall be given by filing a pleading in the action desig-
nating the nonparty and setting forth the nonparty's name and last
known address, or the best identification of the nonparty which is possi-
ble under the circumstances, together with a brief statement of the basis
for believing the nonparty to be at fault.
(c)(1) Except as expressly stated in this section, nothing in this section
shall eliminate or diminish any defenses or immunities which currently
exist.
(2) Assessments of percentages of fault of nonparties shall be used only
for accurately determining the percentage of fault of named parties.
(3) Where fault is assessed against nonparties, findings of fault shall not
subject any nonparty to liability in any action or be introduced as evi-
dence of liability in any action.
87
83. Johnson II, 2009 Ark. 241, at 1-2, _ S.W.3d ; Johnson I, 374 Ark. at 218, 286
S.W.3d at 726.
84. Johnson I, 374 Ark. at 217, 286 S.W.3d at 726.
85. Id. at 219, 286 S.W.3d at 727.
86. Johnson I, 2009 Ark. 241, at 8-10, _ S.W.3d at_.
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Johnson argued to the court that the foregoing provision was unconstitu-
tional for a variety of reasons, including that it violated separation of pow-
ers. 88 Specifically, Johnson asserted that the statute infringed upon the
court's rules of pleading, practice, and procedure because it provided a pro-
cedure for assessing nonparty fault.89 That procedure, Johnson contended,
was unconstitutional because it added to or varied from the Arkansas Rules
of Civil Procedure.9"
The court began by noting that its rule-making authority comes from
Amendment 80, section 3 of the Arkansas Constitution, 91 which grants it the
power to "prescribe the rules of pleading, practice and procedure for all
courts. 92 The court then outlined the precedent, Weidrick and Summerville,
for striking down statutes that conflict with the court's rules of pleading,
practice, and procedure. 93 The court explained that, even if a provision did
not directly conflict with the court's rules, it was unconstitutional: "[W]e
take this opportunity to note that so long as a legislative provision dictates
procedure, that provision need not directly conflict with our procedural rules
to be unconstitutional. This is because rules regarding pleading, practice,
and procedure are solely the responsibility of this court.,
94
Finally, the court reiterated the necessity of distinguishing between
substantive and procedural law when considering questions of separation of
powers because only the latter falls exclusively within the court's prov-
ince.95 The court referenced Arkansas Code section 16-55-201, which mod-
ified joint and several liability, as an example of substantive law because it
defines the right of a party. 96 On the other hand, Arkansas Code section 16-
55-202 was a clear example of procedural law, according to the court, be-
cause it establishes a procedure for a jury to determine nonparty fault
87. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-202 (LEXIS Repl. 2005).




92. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3. However, legal scholars agree that the court held this
power long before the passage of amendment 80. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying
text.
93. Johnson II, 2009 Ark. 241, at 6-8, _ S.W.3d at __
94. Id. at 7, _ S.W.3d at _. On appeal, defendants argued that Arkansas Code sec-
tion 16-55-202 did not directly conflict with the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. The
court noted that any conflict with the rules, direct or indirect, was a violation of separation of
powers and, therefore, unconstitutional. Id. Interestingly, in Weidrick, the court held that the
General Assembly's "add[ing] an additional step" to a court rule was unconstitutional. Wei-
drick, 310 Ark. at 141-42, 835 S.W.2d at 845. At this point in time, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has enunciated a belief that the General Assembly has little or no rule-making authori-
ty.
95. Id. at 7-8, S.W.3d at .
96. Id. at 8, __ S.W.3d at__
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through the filing of a pleading.97 Thus, the court held that it was unconsti-
tutional as violating separation of powers.98
Turning to Arkansas Code section 16-55-212(b), the court likewise
noted that the provision was procedural in nature.99 In fact, the statute dic-
tated what type of evidence could be presented for medical damages: "Any
evidence of damages for the costs of any necessary medical care, treatment,
or services received shall include only those costs actually paid by or on
behalf of the plaintiff or which remain unpaid and for which the plaintiff or
any third party shall be legally responsible."' 00 Because a rule of evidence is
a procedural rule, the court held Arkansas Code section 16-55-212(b) un-
constitutional as violating separation of powers.' 0
IV. NEITHER ARKANSAS CODE SECTION 16-55-202 NOR SECTION 16-55-
212(B) ARE PURELY PROCEDURAL LAW, AND THE SUBSTANTIVE-
PROCEDURAL DISTINCTION IS INSUFFICIENT IN DETERMINING WHETHER A
VIOLATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS EXISTS
Prior to Weidrick, Arnold, and Johnson, the Arkansas Supreme Court
had long recognized that both the judiciary and the General Assembly had
power to adopt and amend rules of practice and procedure. 02 Even after
passage of Amendment 80 to the Arkansas Constitution, the court continued
its efforts of cooperation with the General Assembly by following the rules
set forth in Curtis and its progeny.103 Under those guidelines, the court has
issued nearly three decades' worth of opinions determining separation of
powers questions. Nevertheless, with little or no explanation, the court
abandoned that approach and, in its place, adopted a stark either-or test.
The difficulty in classifying statutes as either substantive or procedural
law proves the futility of the court's new test. Many provisions contain both
substantive and procedural law, yet the Court has nevertheless recognized
them as constitutional.' °4 Consider the statute at issue in Curtis, Arkansas
Code section 16-44-203, which allowed videotaping of a young victim's
97. Id.
98. Id. The court did not address any further arguments regarding the constitutionality
of ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-202. Id.
99. Johnson I, 2009 Ark. 241, at 9, __ S.W.3d at
100. Id. at 9, _ SW.3d at (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-212(b) (LEXIS Repl.
2005)) (emphasis in original).
101. Id. at 10, __ S.W.3d at . The court did not address any further arguments re-
garding the constitutionality of ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-212(b). Id.
102. Curtis, 301 Ark. at 212, 783 S.W.2d at 49.
103. See supra notes 35, 37, and 43 and accompanying text. See also Cato v. Craighead
County Cir. Ct., 2009 Ark. 334, _ SW.3d at __
104. See supra notes 35, 37, and 43 and accompanying text. See also Cato v. Craighead
County Cir. Ct., 2009 Ark. 334, _ S.W.3d _
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testimony outside of the jury's presence to show the videotaped testimony
to the jury in lieu of live testimony by the victim. 05 There is no dispute that
the provision dictates the admissibility of evidence at trial and is procedural
in nature. Conversely, the statute is also substantive because it limits the
rights of criminal defendants to confront their accusers at trial.10 6 Under the
court's new test, Arkansas Code section 16-44-203 is unconstitutional as a
violation of separation of powers.
Similarly, the statutes at issue in Johnson contain both procedural and
substantive law. As previously noted, the statutes were enacted as part of
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 2003 (CJRA),'17 which is commonly re-
ferred to as "tort reform."' 0 8 The General Assembly noted its intent to revise
"the rights, duties, and powers of parties"109 in tort cases in the Emergency
Clause of the CJRA, which provides:
It is found and determined by the General Assembly of the State of Ar-
kansas that in this state, existing conditions, such as the application of
joint and several liability regardless of the percentage of fault, are ad-
versely impacting the availability and affordability of medical liability
insurance; that those existing conditions recently have caused several
medical liability carriers to stop offering coverage in the state and have
caused some medical care providers to curtail or end their practices; that
the decreasing availability and affordability of medical liability is ad-
versely affecting the accessibility and affordability of medical care and
health insurance coverage in this state; that long term care facilities are
having great difficulty hiring qualified medical directors because physi-
cians could be held liable for an entire judgment even if they are found
to be minimally at fault; and that there is a need to improve access to the
courts for deserving claimants; and that this Act is immediately neces-
sary in order to remedy these conditions and improve access to health-
care in this state. 10
Further, one needs only to review Arkansas Code sections 16-55-202
and -212(b) to appreciate that they, in fact, "create[], define[], and regulate[]
105. Curtis, 301 Ark. 208, 783 S.W.2d 47 (1990).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Arkansas Code section 16-44-203 has previously been
challenged on Confrontation Clause grounds and upheld by the Arkansas Supreme Court
because defendants are allowed to cross-examine the victim during the videotaped testimony.
McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 393, 706 S.W.2d 360, 362 (1986); Cranford v. State, 303
Ark. 393, 397, 797 S.W.2d 442, 444-45 (1990).
107. 2003 Ark. Acts 649 (codified as amended in ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-55-201 to -
220).
108. Frazier, supra note 1, at 653.
109. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
110. 2003 Ark. Acts 649, § 26.
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the rights, duties, and powers of parties."'1 11 Specifically, most of Arkansas
Code section 16-55-202 relates only to substantive law:
(a) In assessing percentages of fault, the fact finder shall consider the
fault of all persons or entities who contributed to the alleged injury or
death or damage to property, tangible or intangible, regardless of wheth-
er the person or entity was or could have been named as a party to the
suit.
(b)(1) Negligence or fault of a nonparty shall be considered if the plain-
tiff entered into a settlement agreement with the nonparty or if the de-
fending party gives notice that a nonparty was wholly or partially at fault
not later than one hundred twenty (120) days prior to the date of trial.
(2) The notice shall be given by filing a pleading in the action desig-
nating the nonparty and setting forth the nonparty's name and last
known address, or the best identification of the nonparty which is possi-
ble under the circumstances, together with a brief statement of the basis
for believing the nonparty to be at fault.
(c)(1) Except as expressly stated in this section, nothing in this section
shall eliminate or diminish any defenses or immunities which currently
exist.
(2) Assessments of percentages of fault of nonparties shall be used
only for accurately determining the percentage of fault of named parties.
(3) Where fault is assessed against nonparties, findings of fault shall
not subject any nonparty to liability in any action or be introduced as
evidence of liability in any action. 
112
With this provision, the General Assembly modified the rights of plaintiffs
related to their potential recovery for tort damages by reducing such recov-
ery for the fault of nonparties. Subsection (a) grants tort defendants the right
to have nonparty fault considered when juries determine fault among the
named parties.' 13 Subsection (c) is also substantive law in that it provides
that the right to consideration of nonparty fault (1) does not eliminate any
defense or immunity, (2) is for correctly assessing percentages of fault only,
and (3) cannot be used outside of the action in which the nonparty was
named.1 4 Only subsection (b) contains any procedural directives for assert-
ing the right granted in subsection (a).
111. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
112. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-202 (LEXIS Repl. 2005).
113. Id. § 16-55-202(a).
114. Id. § 16-55-202(c).
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Likewise, Arkansas Code section 16-55-212(b) contains substantive
law because it also limits plaintiffs' rights related to their potential recovery
for tort damages. In particular, it limits tort plaintiffs from recovering the
full amount for medical care or treatment if they or third parties paid a less-
er amount. '15 Unquestionably, the provision is couched as an evidentiary
rule, but that does not lessen the fact that, through Arkansas Code section
16-55-212(b), the General Assembly modified plaintiffs' rights to receive
compensation for medical damages.
Because these provisions are both substantive and procedural law, the
substantive-procedural distinction is inadequate for determining whether
they violate separation of powers. Instead, the Arkansas Supreme Court
should return to the rules set forth in Curtis and Sypult. Under Curtis, Ar-
kansas Code section 16-55-202 would be constitutional because it deals
with an area of practice and procedure for which the Arkansas Supreme
Court has never adopted a rule-assessing the fault of a nonparty-because
the General Assembly created that right with the passage of the CJRA.
Similarly, Arkansas Code section 16-55-212(b) would be constitutional
under the Sypult rule. The CJRA has "a fixed public policy which has been
legislatively or constitutionally adopted" as stated in its Emergency
Clause. 1 6 In addition, Arkansas Code section 16-55-212(b) does not com-
promise the primary purpose and effectiveness of any court rule. Most op-
ponents of Arkansas Code section 16-55-212(b) suggest that it abrogates the
collateral source rule, which "prevents a plaintiffs award from being re-
duced by monies the plaintiff receives from third parties, such as insurance
proceeds." ' 17 The collateral source rule arose because defendants were ar-
guing that, because a plaintiff had already received $20,000 from a third
party for damages, the $50,000 in damages plaintiff was claiming from
them should be reduced by the $20,000 plaintiff had already received. Ar-
kansas courts have consistently held that the plaintiff is entitled to the whole
$50,000, even if it means that the plaintiff receives a double recovery." 8
Generally, the third parties in these situations have a subrogation right to the
amounts they paid once the plaintiff has obtained a judgment." 9
However, Arkansas Code section 16-55-212(b) does not seek to reduce
a plaintiff's award for money received by the plaintiff from third parties.
2
0
Instead, it limits the amount a plaintiff can recover to the same amount the
115. Id.§ 16-55-212(b).
116. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
117. Nelson, supra note 1, at 788 n.48. See also Douglas v. Adams Trucking Co., 345
Ark. 203,212, 46 S.W.3d 512, 517 (2001).
118. Douglas. 345 Ark. at 212,46 S.W.3d at 517.
119. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murray Guard, Inc., 343 Ark. 351, 355-56, 37
S.W.3d 180, 183 (2001).
120. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-212(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2005).
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plaintiff received from third parties, the amount third parties paid on the
plaintiffs behalf, or the amount remaining to be paid by the plaintiff or
third parties. Within the last twenty years, agreements between insurance
companies or the government and medical care providers guarantee that
insurance companies and the government obtain medical care and treatment
for a reduced rate. Now, many medical care providers will also give a re-
duced rate to a patient without health insurance. Nevertheless, all medical
bills include the original price for the treatment and then the reduced
amount that is owed. Arkansas Code section 16-55-212(b) seeks to compen-
sate a plaintiff for only the amount actually paid and not the medical care
provider's original price.' 21 Accordingly, this provision does not compro-
mise the primary purpose and effectiveness of the collateral source rule and
would be held constitutional under Sypult.
V. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO ARKANSAS CODE SECTIONS 16-55-202 AND
16-55-212(B) TO COMPLY WITH JOHNSON'S DIRECTIVES
Before revision can be discussed, it should be noted that, arguably, no
revision of Arkansas Code section 16-55-202 is necessary. The CJRA in-
cludes a severability clause, which provides:
If any provisions of [the CJRA] or the application of [the CJRA] to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect oth-
er provisions or applications of [the CJRA] which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provi-
sions of [the CJRA] are declared to be severable.
122
The Johnson court spent little time discussing which parts of Arkansas Code
section 16-55-202 were procedural in nature and, therefore, unconstitution-
al. 1 23 Further, the Johnson court did not address the severability clause or its
application to any invalid portion of Arkansas Code section 16-55-202. Be-
cause of these oversights and the strong presumption of constitutionality on
Arkansas statutes, 124 portions of Arkansas Code section 16-55-202 may still
be in effect.
If the substantive law contained in Arkansas Code section 16-55-202
remains in effect, it falls to the Arkansas Supreme Court to enact rules and
procedures to effectuate the right contained in the statute. 125 If no such rules
121. Id.
122. Id. § 16-55-220(c).
123. Johnson v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 2009 Ark. 241, at 8, __ S.W.3d __
(Johnson I1).
124. Eady v. Lansford, 351 Ark. 249, 256, 92 S.W.3d 57, 61 (2002) (internal citations
omitted).
125. ARK. CONST. amend. 80, § 3.
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exist, it falls to trial courts to develop the needed rules and procedures:
"Procedure Not Specifically Prescribed. When no procedure is specifically
prescribed by [the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure], the court shall pro-
ceed in any lawful manner not inconsistent with the Constitution of this
State, [the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure] or any applicable statute.,
126
Consequently, a strong argument exists that the substantive law set forth in
Arkansas Code section 16-55-202 remains intact and that trial courts must
implement the same until the Arkansas Supreme Court enacts appropriate
rules regarding the provision.
Assuming, however, that all of Arkansas Code section 16-55-202 is
unconstitutional, revising the statute to comply with Johnson is simple. On-
ly subsection (b) deals with procedure, so it should be left out of the revised
provision. A revision of Arkansas Code section 16-55-212(b) is almost as
simple:
A .. e. denee -Of A plaintiff may recover damages for the costs of any
necessary medical care, treatment, or services received which shall in-
clude only those costs actually paid by or on behalf of the plaintiff or
which remain unpaid and for which the plaintiff or any third party shall
be legally responsible.
These revisions, of course, deal only with the separation of powers defects
outlined in Johnson. Those provisions may still be susceptible to constitu-
tional challenge on other grounds.
VI. CONCLUSION
A theoretical discussion of separation of powers should always leave
matters of practice and procedure to the judiciary. In the real world, howev-
er, that line is not easily drawn or followed. In the past, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court has approached this twilight zone with an attitude of coopera-
tion. Now, the court instead applies the faulty substantive-procedural dis-
tinction, a rule based solely on boilerplate definitions contained in Black's
Law Dictionary. 127 The court should return to the Curtis and Sypult rules for
a better method of determining whether a General Assembly rule violates
separation of powers, while seeking "a healthy and orderly development of
procedural reform.'
128
126. ARK. R. Civ. P. 81(c).
127. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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